Seabed Boundaries between Coastal States: The Effect to be Given Islets as Special Circumstances by Ely, Northcutt
NORTHCUTT ELY*
Seabed Boundaries Between Coastal
States: The Effect to be Given
Islets as "Special Circumstances" t
1. The Problem
This discussion relates to the effect to be given small islets in the
determination of seabed boundaries,' (seaward of the territorial sea) (!)
between coastal States which are adjacent to one another on the same
coast, or (2) between coastal States which occupy opposing coasts. 2 The
question, in its simplest terms, is whether a State which owns a little island
off its mainland coast or the coast of its neighbor may demand that the
coast of its islet, rather than its mainland, be the baseline from which the
seabed boundary shall be computed, as against that neighbor. The problem
usually arises in connection with the demarcation of median or equidis-
tance lines.
As to what is meant by a "small islet," of course no dogmatic definition
is possible. The problem is not solved by relating it to a rule of de minimus.
Even when the island has an area measured in many scores of square
miles, the effect of conceding to its coast the status of a baseline for
demarcation of a seabed median line against another State may be measur-
able in hundreds, indeed in some cases thousands, of square miles.
*Counsellor at Law, Washington, D.C.
tThis paper was presented by the author at the Seminar on Petroleum Legislation with
Particular Reference to Offshore Operations, held by the Economic Commission for Asia and
the Far East Committee on Industry and Natural Resources, 18-25 October 197 1, Bangkok,
Thailand. It has been revised for publication here.
1The expression "seabed boundaries" is used here as "shorthand" for the longer and
more accurate expression "boundaries between submarine areas in which different coastal
States, whose land territories are adjacent to such areas, may exercise exclusive sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the seabed and
subsoil."2For purposes of this discussion: (i) It is assumed that the seabed with which we are
concerned is within the limits of national jurisdiction of coastal States, with respect to the
exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to their coasts, howsoever those limits may be determined. We do
not discuss here the seaward extent of the limits of national jurisdiction with respect to seabed
resources. (ii) We are not concerned here with the width of the territorial sea; we limit our
consideration to the seabed which underlies the high seas, seaward of the territorial sea.
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 2
220 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
2. The Nature of Rights in the Seabed and Subsoil
We assume that the seabed area in question constitutes the "natural
prolongation" of the land territories of two or more coastal States, in-
cluding, as land territories, one or more islands. The concept of "prolonga-
tion," referred to repeatedly by the International Court of Justice in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), I.C.J. Rep. 1969,
p. 3) is the premise for the conflicting claims which occasion the neces-
sity for demarcation of a seabed boundary.
It will be important, as we go along, to remember the enormous dis-
tinction between the coastal State's "continental shelf rights" or "seabed
rights" 3 and its rights in the territorial sea.
As to the territorial sea, if the coastal State's claim does not exceed the
width permissible under international law (all States recognize a width of at
least 3 miles, a plurality of States now recognize a width up to 12 miles, a
very small number claim more than that), its sovereignty is complete. In
the language of Article I of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone,
(I) the Sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its
internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the
territorial sea.
This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provisions of these articles and
to other rules of internaional law.
Moreover, Article 2 of the same Convention says:
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air space over the
territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.
By contrast, the first three articles of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf (which were held to declare customary international law by the
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases)
describe the character of the coastal State's seabed rights in these much
more restricted terms:
(Article 2. I): The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sover-
eign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph I of this article are exclusive in the
sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit
its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim
to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State.
3We prefer to use the term "seabed rights," because, as we shall see, the rights of the
coastal State to control exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and
its subsoil are not limited to the geological continental shelf.
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But Article 3 stipulates:
The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the
legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the air space
above these waters.
This restricted category of rights in the seabed and subsoil is not limited
geographically by any stated distance from the coast, but, as Article I puts
it:
For the purpose of these articles, the term 'continental shelf' is used as
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres, or
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and
subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands."
3. Baselines and the Equidistance Principle
The mention of islands in Article I of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf brings us directly to our problem. It frequently happens that two or
more States occupying opposite coasts, or occupying territories adjacent to
one another on the same coast, claim the same areas of the continental
shelf as being submarine areas adjacent to their respective territories. One
or all of them may invoke the equidistance line principle for the demarca-
tion of seabed boundaries. One or more of them may desire the advantage
of measuring this line from an island which it owns, rather than from its
mainland coast.4
The principle of the median line, as between opposing coasts, and the
correlative principle of the equidistance line, as between States occupying
the same coast, are stated as follows in Article 6 of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or
more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the
continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agree-
ment between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another bound-
ary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line,
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two
adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be
4A more extreme case, of course, is that of a seabed claim based on a small islet in
mid-ocean, perhaps in a sea distant from any important mainland coast of the sovereign which
owns the islet. This problem is subject to the solution suggested in Part 6, infra.
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determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each
State is measured.
The "baselines" thus referred to are those established in accordance
with Article 3 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. Article 3 provides that:
"Except where otherwise provided in these articles, the normal baseline for
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the
coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal
State."
The exceptions relate to straight baselines "where the coast is deeply
indented or cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast" (Art.
4, discussed in more detail, infra), and straight baselines closing the mouths
of bays (Art. 7).
Postponing for the moment the question of whether one or both para-
graphs of Article 6 state customary as well as conventional international
law, our problem of the recognition to be given islands in the establishment
of seabed boundaries can be stated, in the terms of Article 6, as a question
of whether a particular small island shall be recognized as affording a
baseline from which to calculate a median (or equidistance) line, or wheth-
er it shall be denied that status because some other line (e.g., a median line
between major bodies of land) is justified by "special circumstances."
An "island" is defined by Article 10. 1 of the Convention on the Territo-
rial Sea and the Contiguous Zone as "a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water at high tide." There is no restriction here as to size.
Exposed rocks which are mere menaces to navigation are "islands" by this
definition. Article 3 of the same convention provides that "Except where
otherwise provided in these articles, the normal baseline for measuring the
breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked
on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State." Article
10.2 of the same Convention provides that "the territorial sea of an island
is measured in accordance with the provisions of these articles." Thus an
islet, no matter how small, has a "baseline" (with consequences to be
discussed later), and it possesses a territorial sea, measured from that
baseline.5
Article 12 of that Convention provides that where the coasts of two
States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither is entitled, failing
agreement to the contrary, "to extend its territorial sea beyond the median
5The other two 1958 Conventions, the Convention on the High Seas, and the Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, are not
involved in our problem.
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line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two
States is measured." But it goes on to say that "The provisions of this
paragraph shall not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of
historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of
the two States in a way which is at variance with this provision."
Article 24 of the same Convention recognizes a contiguous zone, "in a
zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea," where it may ex-
ercise "the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea.
This contiguous zone may not extend beyond 12 miles from the baseline
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
Article 24.2 of the Convention, recognizing the possibility of overlaps
between contiguous zones, proposes the median line principle for determi-
nation of the boundary between these competing zones. But, perhaps
significantly, it makes no mention of "special circumstances." The mandate
is that "neither of the two States" (opposite or adjacent) "is entitled, failing
agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its contiguous zone
beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest
points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of the
two States is measured."
To sum up: Under the 1958 conventions (1) an island has a baseline,
and, measured from that baseline, it has (2) a territorial sea of unstated
breadth, (3) a contiguous zone 12 miles wide, and (4) a continental shelf
area of a size yet to be discussed. We may assume that this is true of
customary law as well, although a question mark may be justified as to the
contiguous zone.
We have noted that an island's local baseline is employed for the mea-
surement of its territorial sea and its contiguous zone, and for the addition-
al measurement of a median line in cases where its territorial sea or
contiguous zone overlaps that of another sovereign, regardless of the
island's size. And we have noted that this same baseline is used as the
point of commencement of measurement of median and equidistance lines.
Our problem is whether an island, regardless of size or distance from its
owner's major land territories, is entitled in all cases to recognition of its
coast as a baseline for the calculation of a median (or equidistance) line for
the demarcation of seabed boundaries under Article 6 of the Convention
on the Continental Shelf (or comparable principles of customary law),6
6The Court in the North Sea Cases rejected the contention of Denmark and the Nether-
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against the coast of another sovereign's mainland or major island, as it
would be if the task were simply the measurement of its territorial sea or
contiguous zone.
Let us see what the authorities have said about this question.
4. Treatment of Islets in the Literature
The Court's opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases sheds
some light on the problem of islands in the demarcation of seabed bound-
aries, but only to the extent of identifying offshore islands as a "special
circumstance"; islands were not actually a factor in establishing North Sea
baselines. Thus, the Court mentions the contention of the Netherlands and
Denmark that "special circumstances" were severely limited, but that even
those parties conceded that "islets" amounted to special circumstances.
The Court characterized their contention thus (para. 13, p. 20):
•.. only the presence of some special feature, minor in itself-such as an
islet or small protuberance-but so placed as to produce a disproportionately
distorting effect on an otherwise acceptable boundary line would, so it was
claimed, possess this character.
Speaking of the justification for use of the median-line principle as
between opposing coasts, the Court said (para. 57, p. 36):
* The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be
claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. These
prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by
means of a median line; and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and minor
coastal projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be
eliminated by other means, such a line must effect an equal division of the
particular area involved. (Emphasis added.)
Judge Sorenson's dissenting opinion went further, in justifying the equi-
distance rule. He called attention to the discussions in the International
Law Commission which preceded the 1958 conference on the Law of the
Sea which produced the Convention on the Continental Shelf as well as the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (both of which
state the "special circumstance" rule). He said: 7
* The problem, however, of the degree to which the 'special circum-
stances rule' should be considered as an exception to the main rule, and of
lands that paragraph 2 of Article 6 (relating to lateral boundaries between adjacent States) was
declaratory of customary international law, absent agreement, but strongly implied that
paragraph 1, relating to median lines between opposing coasts, would be recognized as stating
a principle of customary law. Para. 57. The Court spoke also of other criteria or special
circumstances which may properly be given consideration: proportionality of length of
coast-lines, location of the resource, the conformation of coast-lines, etc. See 101(D).
7[1969] I.C.J. 3, at 254. Judge Sorenson would have applied the equidistance rule to the
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exactly how 'exceptional' it should be, is largely identical with the problem as
to whether the words 'special circumstances' should be given a wide or a
narrow construction, and as to the nature of the 'special circumstances' which
could justify a departure from the principle of equidistance.
This question is not only crucial to the settlement of the dispute between
the Parties, if, as I believe, Article 6 is applicable, but also the most difficult
question to answer. The ordinary and natural meaning of the words in the
context of Article 6 does not give any guidance. If one then turns to the
travaux preparatoires, some guidance is found in the debates and in the
reports of the International Law Commission. Mention is made of 'any
exceptional configuration of the coast, as well as the presence of islands or of
navigable channels' (I.L.C. Report; 1953, Commentary on Article 82, and
Report, 1956, Commentary on Article 72). At the Geneva Conference, one
of the members of the 1953 Committee of Experts, Commander Kennedy,
speaking this time as a representative of the United Kingdom, mentioned as
examples of special circumstances 'the presence of a small or large island in
the area to be apportioned,' such islands to be 'treated on their merits,' of 'the
possession by one of the two States concerned of special mineral exploitation
rights or fishery rights, or the presence of a navigable channel' (Official
Records, Vol. VI, p. 93).
Commander Kennedy's memorandum, referred to by Judge Sorenson,
was distributed by the British delegation at the 1958 conference.8 It was
more explicit. It said:
IV. Islands.
The presence of islands may complicate some sea boundary problems and
form real difficulties. Some of these will only be touched on briefly here.
In the case of the delimitation of a boundary through the territorial sea it
may in general seem reasonable to take into account the base lines of islands
lying within the belt of territorial sea in order to arrive at the boundary.
Should, however, one State claim a wider belt of territorial sea than its
neighbour, an inequitable result may often occur.
For a boundary across a continental shelf the problem of islands may
become very acute. It would seem most inequitable for instance, if the
existence of an island or islet (which by definition need only be a small
above-water rock or sandbank, possibly only a few yards long and a few feet
high) should be allowed to divert a boundary and thus give extensive areas of
shelf to the State possessing the island. Should such an island exist about
halfway between opposite States, both on the same Continental shelf, and its
base lines be allowed to be used in forming the median line, this line would be
switched from the middle of the area separating the States to three quarters of
the way across, towards one side or the other dependent upon the sovereignty
of the islet. Such a situation might well give rise to international friction as to
the ownership of the islet. This is of course an extreme case but any islands
determination of seabed boundaries between the adjacent States involved in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases.8Commander R. H. Kennedy, Brief Remarks on Median Lines and Lines of Equidis-
tance and on the Methods Used in Their Construction, a paper distributed with the com-
pliments of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2d
April, 1958, pp. 7-8.
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near a boundary may have a similar but lesser effect. It might seem reason-
able under such circumstances not to permit these islands to have any
influence on a boundary but to allow them only their own belts of territorial
sea for the purposes of exploration and exploitation.8a
Another case is that of a comparatively large and important island whose
territorial sea is only just separated from that of the mainland. Here it might
with some justification be considered that the island should influence the
boundary. Thus size, position and importance may well be deciding criteria in
assessing whether or not any particular island should be taken into account
when forming a sea boundary.
In this connection it might be remarked that in the case of the larger and
more important islands of the world, no one would deny them continental
shelves.
Commander Kennedy's paper is entitled to weight as the writing of a
recognized expert, aside from the added standing given it by the sponsor-
ship of his paper by the delegation of the United Kingdom.
The problem is stated by Miss Gutteridge of the U.K. Foreign Office (35
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 102, at 120 (1959)):
There is also some obscurity in Article 6 of the Convention as to what is
meant by 'special circumstances.' One clear example of 'special circum-
stances' is, however, the presence of islands. Where the continental shelf
underlies an area of shallow sea, such as the Perisan Gulf, which has many
islands and is surrounded by the coasts of opposite or adjacent States, the
drawing of the boundary on the strict principle of the median line, could, it is
clear, result in many curious and inequitable deflections of the median line.
There may, for instance, be a very small island which lies approximately in
the middle of the shallow sea; or there may be islands which are so close to
the mainland as to be justifiably considered part of the mainland for the
purposes of working out the boundary of the continental shelf. Again there
may be islands which although near to the coast of State A are under the
sovereignty of State B. All these circumstances not only show the difficulty of
a uniform application of the median line principle, but also explain why the
1958 Geneva Conference found itself unable (as did the International Law
Commission in its draft Articles) to include in the Convention any specific
provisions about the effect of the presence of islands on the delimitation of
the boundaries of the continental shelf.
In accord, see: Lauterpacht, 27 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 410 (1950); Padwa, 9
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 654 (1960); M. McDougal and W. Burke, The Public
Order of the Oceans 436-437 (1962).
The general theory of the doctrine of special circumstances is outlined
by Professor Oda (12 Japanese Ann. of Int'l Law 264, at 280-283
(1968)):
Thus, taking into account the existence of all islands in drawing the median
line is not conceivable. The existence of islands is no more than one of the
8
"We suggest allowance of an area equal to that of the 12 mile contiguous zone. See Part
6, infra.
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factors to justify special circumstances. The State which wishes to claim the
special circumstances has to prove them. However, so far as there is no
precedent at all in fact, success or failure of proving special circumstances,
cannot but depend upon whether or not the mutual consent of the States
concerned is obtained unless decided by other means such as international
arbitration or the International Court of Justice.
5. Practice of States
When we turn to actual examples of the effect given small islands in
international settlements, we find no adjudicated cases, and about a dozen
agreements which throw varying degrees of light on our problem.
The Geographer of the U.S. State Department has published a series of
seabed boundary agreements, with accompanying maps.9 Taking them in
the order of the State Department's serial numbers, those involving islets
show the following:
(1) Indonesia-Malaysia. The parties agreel to draw straight baselines
following the general direction of the coasts of their mainland territories
and encompassing their islets, and established a median line between these
baselines. "Trade-offs" appear to have been made with respect to small
islets, as a result of which a very small Malaysian islet in the Strait of
Malacca was given substantial weight.
(2) Norway-Sweden. Some small Swedish islets or exposed rocks were
ignored, i.e., were not used as basepoints.
(9) Italy-Yugoslavia (Adriatic Sea). In general, the agreed boundary is
the median line between the Italian mainland and the major Yugoslav
islands which fringe the coast of that nation. All of these Yugoslav coastal
islands, as it happens, would be encompassed by intersecting arcs with a
9These are separately published under the title INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY:
SERIES A: LIMITS IN THE SEAS. The agreements mapped, with their numbers in the series, and
dates of publication, are as follows:
No. States or Areas Date of Publication
I Indonesia-Malaysia January 22, 1970
2 Norway-Sweden January 22, 1970
9 Italy-Yugoslavia February 20, 1970
10 The North Sea (this map shows both agreed
continental shelf boundaries, and agreed territorial sea boundaries) March 2, 1970
I1 Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela March 6, 1970
12 Bahrain-Saudi Arabia March 10, 1970
16 Finland-Soviet Union May 25, 1970
17 Norway-Soviet Union May 27, 1970
18 Abu Dhabi-Qatar May 29, 1970
24 Iran-Saudi Arabia Not dated
25 Iran-Qatar July 9, 1970
26 Denmark-Sweden (territorial sea boundary) July 16, 1970
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radius equal to the width of the territorial sea, measured from the mainland
and from the nearest large island. However, four Yugoslav islands lie
farther to sea: Jabuka, Andrija, Pelagruz, and Kajola. All are very small.
The first two were given very slight effect (not that of basepoints as against
the Italian coast) and, to compensate for the minor dislocation of the
intercoastal median line which they were permitted to occasion, the equi-
distance line was adjusted slightly in Italy's favor elsewhere. The Yugoslav
islands of Pelagruz and Kajola lie right on the intercoastal median line.
That line was not deflected to become a median line between those islands
and the Italian coast. Instead, a 12-mile arc was drawn around each island,
and the intercoastal median line was caused to detour toward Italy to
follow this interlocking series of arcs. This radius of 12 miles is of particu-
lar interest because Yugoslavia claims only a 10-mile territorial sea. (Italy
claims 6.) A distance of 12 miles equates with the width of the contiguous
zone, which is assured by Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone to all coastal States irrespective of the width
of their territorial seas. The boundary, as it proceeded on toward the mouth
of the Adriatic, was modified slightly from the equidistance line, to make
up, in Italy's favor, the deviation in the equidistance line which had been
made in Yugoslavia's favor around those last two Yugoslav islands.
(12) Bahrain-Saudi Arabia (Persian Gulf). Article I of the agreement
recites that the boundary line is located "on the basis of the median line."
The State Department Geographer's summary says:
There are two unique features of the continental shelf agreement between
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. First, is the case of the Fasht bu Saafa Hexagon,
which is under Saudi Arabian jurisdiction. Saudi Arabia has agreed to the
exploitation of a resource under its jurisdiction, but to share the revenue from
such exploitation with Bahrain.
Secondly, is the employment of two variations of the equidistance principle
in determining midpoints. This Agreement is an example of the establishment
of the CSB [Continental Shelf Boundary] by selecting points halfway between
predetermined land markers. These land markers were selected in-
dependently of the coastal configuration. In another modification of the equi-
distance principle small islands were ignored in some instances in determining
the terminal or turning points on the CSB.
(16) Finland-Soviet Union. The boundary in the Gulf of Finland, for a
distance of about 23 miles, marks the middle of the territorial sea claims
(Finland claims 4 nautical miles, the Soviet Union 12). For the remaining
124 miles it is a continental shelf boundary, drawn on equidistance prin-
ciples, apparently giving effect to the small islets on both sides of the line.
(17) Norway-Soviet Union. The U.S. State Geographer's comment is
that "The Norway-Soviet Union Continental Shelf Boundary is an ex-
ample of the selective utilization of the equidistance principle. The two
terminal points.., are median points.... However, the line connecting the
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two termini was not drawn to equally divide the water area." Among other
things, it appears not to give recognition to two small Soviet islands as
basepoints.
(18) Abu Dhabi-Qatar (Persian Gulf). The agreed line begins and ends
as an equidistance line, and at one intermediate point it is an equidistance
line between two small islands owned by the two parties. But, where it
encounters the 3-mile territorial sea line of Abu Dhabi's island of Daiyina,
it detours along that arc in Abu Dhabi's favor, resuming its original course
thereafter. The significant point here is that this island was not given effect
in drawing a median line as against the mainland; if it had, the line would
have gone far to the north, in Abu Dhabi's favor. At another point, where
the line intersects a known oil field, the agreement provides that the field
shall be developed by the concessionaire of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, but
"all royalties, profits and other government fees" shall be equally divided
between the two governments.
(24) Iran-SaudiArabia (Persian Gulf). The boundary line in general is a
median line between the opposite mainland coasts. Three islands caused
problems.
At the upper end of the Gulf is the island of Kharg, which belongs to
Iran. It is some 16 miles off the mainland coast. This island was given
"half-effect," that is, the line was constructed so as to divide equally the
area between (i) a line equidistant from the Saudi Arabian mainland and the
island of Kharg (full effect), and (ii) a line equidistant from both the
mainland of Iran and Saudi Arabia (giving no effect to Kharg). However,
the line so constructed was then modified in a zigzag manner so as to avoid
interference with known oil structures.
In mid-Gulf lie the two islands of Farsi, belonging to Iran, and
AI-'Arabiyah, belonging to Saudi Arabia. They are less than 24 miles apart.
Here an equidistance line was drawn between the two islands. When the
median line between the two mainland coasts intersected the 12-mile terri-
torial sea line around Farsi, it followed that belt on the side facing Saudi
Arabia until it met the median line between the two islands; it followed that
line easterly until it met the limit of the belt of territorial sea around
Al-'Arabiyah, thence followed the limit of that belt on the side facing Iran
until it intersected again the median line between the two mainland coasts.
(25) Iran-Qatar (Persian Gulf). The State Department Geographer's
comment, as printed in the International Boundary Study, is:
The Iran-Qatar continental shelf boundary (CSB) is based on the equidis-
tance principle with the exception that the presence of all islands in the
Persian Gulf was disregarded.
(26) Denmark-Sweden. As stated by the State Department Geographer
in the International Boundary Study:
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 2
230 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
From the northern terminus to Lous Flak, the TSB (territorial sea bound-
ary) is an equidistance line 28 nautical miles long. This line ignores the
presence of the Swedish offshore island of Ven....
In other portions of the line, it is equidistant from the two mainlands.
Three other recent boundary problems involving small islets require
notice.
Mexico-United States. A treaty signed November 30, 1970, between
Mexico and the United States, 10 among other features, fixes an "in-
ternational marine boundary in the Pacific Ocean." It is an equidistance
line (calculated with the aid of computers) which gives recognition to small
Mexican islets, elements of Islas Los Coronados, located about seven
miles from the Mexican coast.
Sharjah-Iran-Umm al Qaiwain. The island of Abu Musa is situated in
the Persian Gulf some 40 miles off the Arabian coast. It is claimed by
Sharjah and Iran, and is populated by some 800 subjects of Sharjah. It is
astride the lateral boundary (an equidistance line) between Sharjah and the
adjoining Emirate of Umm al Qaiwain. While this lateral boundary has
been agreed upon between the two Emirates, no agreement has been
reached as to the frontal boundary, that is, the boundary between the island
of Abu Musa and the mainland coast of Umm al Qaiwain. In 1971 Sharjah
and Iran entered into arrangements, via the British Foreign Office, where-
by, without conceding the other's claim to sovereignty, each agrees that the
island has a twelve-mile territorial sea. Petroleum operations are to be
carried out by Sharjah's concessionaire, and the governmental share of
revenues is to be equally divided between Iran and Sharjah. Each govern-
ment has jurisdiction in agreed areas of the island. No provision is made
for use of Abu Musa's coast as a baseline for a median line against either
the Arabian or Iranian coast.
Italy-Tunisia. A seabed treaty is under negotiation. Several small Italian
islands lie between the African mainland and the major Italian island of
Sicily. Some of these are on the African continental shelf. Among other
proposals understood to be under consideration is one which would estab-
lish a median line between the two major coasts (it would lie in waters
deeper than 200 meters, in places), and would allocate to the Italian islands
which lie on the African side of this line a share of the continental shelf
equivalent to the width of the 12-mile contiguous zone, as enclaves within
the Tunisian portion of the continental shelf. No final agreement has been
announced. It is notable that Italy claims only a 6-mile territorial sea.
10 See Treaty with Mexico resolving boundary disputes, Exec. B, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Senate, awaiting ratification, as of August 197 1.
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6. Guidelines for Solutions
Without suggesting that dogmatic rules are practicable, the following
general guidelines seem justified, in deciding whether the coast of a particu-
lar islet shall be recognized as a baseline for the demarcation of a seabed
boundary against the opposite or adjacent coast of another State.
The case of the islet adjacent to its owner's mainland. It seems clear
that recognition must be given to an islet, no matter how small, that is so
close to, and identified with, a mainland or a major island as to be fairly
included in a system of straight baselines uniting it with that major land
mass.
Straight baselines are authorized in certain circumstances, by Article 4
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Article
4 reads:
Article 4
1. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the
method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in
drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within
the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to
the regime of internal waters.
3. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations unless
lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level
have been built on them.
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under the provi-
sions of paragraph I, account may be taken in determining particular base-
lines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and
the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a
manner as to cut off from the high seas the territorial sea of another State.
6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight baselines on charts, to
which due publicity must be given.
Article 4, in turn, paraphrases language of the International Court of
Justice in the Norwegian Fisheries Case, [19511 I.C.J. Rep. 116. See also
the discussion of straight baselines in the North Sea Cases, [1969] I.C.J.
Rep. 3, para. 98.
In such cases, the argument will be over the justifiable length of the
straight baselines," and this can be a formidable question on its own.
As a variation of the principle of the straight baseline, an islet should be
"The Geographer of the U.S. State Department publishes maps of straight baselines as
proclaimed by various nations. Most of these are unilateral claims and many of them do not
conform to the criterion stated in the Convention. The series is captioned "International
Boundary Study, Series A, Limits in the Seas: Straight Baselines." A number is assigned to
each report.
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prima facie entitled to recognition of its coast as a component of a baseline
for demarcation of seabed boundaries if any portion of the islet lies within
24 nautical miles of the coast of its owner's mainland or major island. This
is because the island's 12-mile contiguous zone merges with the 12-mile
contiguous zone of the larger land territory, the two thus forming an
envelope encompassing both.
Some "archipelago" claims may be unrelated to the straight baseline
concept, and go much further. There has been no recognition of such
claims by treaty, so far as we have found, except to a limited extent in the
agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia, and perhaps in the case of the
Philippines. 12
The case of the isolated islet. We come now to the problem posed by the
islet which is too distant from its owner's mainland coast to justify its
identification with that coast, either as a component of a straight baseline,
or as a component of interlocking envelopes of contiguous zones of main-
land and island. 13
What criteria must such an island meet, in order to justify recognition of
its coast as a baseline for demarcation of a median line or equidistance line
as against another State's mainland or major island (assuming always that
the seabed in question is the prolongation of the land territories of all of the
competitors)? It must be borne in mind that recognition of such an isolated
islet may have the effect of attributing to its owner areas of the seabed
extending possibly hundreds of miles from its small coast, and encompass-
ing seabed areas which are thousands of times as great as the islet's land
area.
These being the possible consequences, extreme caution is justified in
according recognition to isolated islets as independent baselines, and the
burden of proof should clearly be on the party asserting the right to so
employ them.
The criterion of population. At the outset, therefore, we would dis-
qualify isolated islands, irrespective of size, which are not only too distant
to be in contact with the contiguous zone envelope of their owner's terri-
tories, but are also uninhabited or support only caretakers or other tokens
of the owner's sovereignty, such as lighthouses or communications facil-
"2The boundaries claimed by the Philippines are based on a treaty between the United
States and Spain which fixed lines in the sea with turning points which appear to bear little
relation to relative proximity of land masses, and no relation to the median line concept.
"
3Where an islet lies on the same side of a median line (drawn in disregard of that islet),
as does the mainland of the nation owning it, of course no question arises as to the area of the
continental shelf which appertains to that islet. This area, whatever it may be, is included
within the larger area which is encompassed by the median line between opposite coasts of
mainlands or large islands.
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ities. If an island is too small or insignificant to have attracted its owner's
national resources, in terms of population and investments, it is too small
to serve as'a baseline for a seabed median line.
The criteria identified in the North Sea decision. The International
Court of Justice, in its North Sea Continental Shelf decision, identified
several factors which should be given weight in determining an equidis-
tance line (para. 10 1D). These seem relevant also in fixing the parameters
of "special circumstances" with regard to islands:
(1) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the
presence of any special or unusual features;
(2) so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical and geological
structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelf areas involved;
(3) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimita-
tion carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about
between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal
State and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of the
coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the effects, actual or
prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitations between adjacent
States in the same region.
The general thrust of the Court's criteria would seem to be against,
rather than in favor of, recognition of isolated islets as baselines for deter-
mination of continental shelf boundaries as against land masses having
substantially longer coastlines.
The criterion of "distortion." Commander Kennedy and Miss Gutte-
ridge (supra) have called attention to the distortion in a median line (as
between mainland coasts) which might result from recognition of an island
owned by one State, lying on another State's side of the mainland median
line. The same result follows, on a lesser scale, perhaps, with respect to
any islet situated at a distance from its owner's mainland. It may be
relevant to inquire, in each case, whether the distortion is of major signifi-
cance, whether both States are claiming islands as baselines, and how far
each island is from its owner's mainland, the distance from the island's
coast to the median line based upon it, the ratio between that distance and
the island's diameter, and other equitable factors.
The criterion of size. Just how small must an island be, to be disqualified
by the "special circumstance" rule? Some interesting numbers appear
when we compare the area of a small island with the area of its territorial
sea or its contiguous zone. To avoid disparities resulting from different
widths of the territorial sea, we may concentrate on the area of the 12-mile
contiguous zone, which, under Article 24 of the Convention on the Territo-
rial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, has a worldwide width of 12 nautical
miles, irrespective of the width of the territorial sea. We discover that an
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islet with a diameter of only one mile commands a contiguous zone which
is over 190 times as large as its land mass, and the ratio does not approach
unity until we consider an island with a diameter of nearly 60 miles, or an
area of some 2,800 square miles.
The following table illustrates this. For simplicity, a circular island is
assumed, with diameter D. Its area is then 7r(.&)2 . The area of its 12-mile
contiguous zone is .(+ l2)2- r( )2 . For various island diameters, in
miles, the comparison of areas in square miles is:
Approximate
Approximate area of 12-mile







But does this require us to challenge recognition of an island or group
of contiguous islands as a baseline for calculation of a median line against
an opposing mainland coast if the island or contiguous group (each less
than 24 miles from its neighbors) has an area less than that of its con-
tiguous zone, that is to say, an area of about 2,800 square miles?
It is a tempting dogma, but not in all cases a fair one. Some islands,
much smaller than this, are of economic importance, densely populated and
linked to the economy of the mainland and to that of other outlying islands.
Common sense seems to compel a concept of unity of mainland and
outlying islands, even at a distance of scores of miles, when island popu-
lations of say several thousands, and an important interlocked main-
land-island economy, are involved. Perhaps islands of this category may be
given half-effect (as in the case of Kharg island in the Persian Gulf), or
given a proportional effect reflecting the ratio between the distance from
the island to its owner's mainland shore, and the distance from the island to
the opposing coast.
Again, an island with a land area substantially exceeding that of its
contiguous zones (i.e., an island over 60 miles in diameter) may be located
so far from the nearest opposite coast that to draw a median line between it
and that coast would create a manifest distortion.
We conclude that area alone (even of a populated island) does not afford
a controlling criterion. The burden of proof that an island is not disqualified
by its diminutive size should rest upon the owner when its area is less than
that of its contiguous zone, or when there is a great disparity between the
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island's area and that of the opposite land mass, or between the island's
diameter and its distance from the opposing coast.
Quite another situation is presented when the problem is one of drawing
a median line between two islands, or between two mainland powers each
of which owns islands in the sea between their respective mainlands. In
cases such as this (notably in the Iranian-Saudi Arabian settlement, and
that between Italy and Yugoslavia, previously cited), it is quite natural and
logical to give the opposing islets identical treatment. By agreement, they
can be ignored, or be given full weight, or be given "half weight" (as in the
case of the Iranian island of Kharg). No inequity is involved in such a case,
as there would be in giving an isolated islet full weight as against a
mainland coast, as Commander Kennedy so eloquently pointed out in 1958
(supra).
The contiguous zone analogy with respect to small islets. Even though
we decline to give small islets full weight as baselines for calculation of a
seabed median line against a mainland coast, it does not follow that no
share of the adjacent continental shelf is attributable to them, or that such
an islet is restricted to a band of the continental shelf coterminous with its
territorial sea boundary-a particularly onerous alternative if the islet's
owner happens to claim only a 3-mile territorial sea. To the contrary, it
seems equitable to attribute to every islet a share of the adjacent continen-
tal shelf coterminous with its 12-mile contiguous zone, even though the
islet is too small to justify recognition of its coast as a baseline for calcu-
lation of a seabed median line. This suggestion is not based on the premise
that the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
includes seabed resource rights in the inventory of powers attributed by
that Convention to a State in respect of its contiguous zone (it does not),
but is based on a quite different argument.
The International Court of Justice commented in the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf Cases (paragraph 96) that the contiguous zone and the conti-
nental shelf are "concepts of the same kind" as instances of "encroach-
ment on maritime expanses which, during the greater part of history,
appertained to no-one." "In both instances," the Court's judgment contin-
ued, "the principle is applied that the land dominates the sea," the principle
of the continental shelf being "the prolongation or continuation of... the
land sovereignty of the coastal State, into and under the high seas, via the
bed of its territorial sea which is under the full sovereignty of that State"
(para. 43).
The contiguous zone does not need to be specifically claimed by decree
or proclamation, in order for it to be effective. In this sense, also, it
resembles the continental shelf right.
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Significantly, Article 24.3 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone is cast in the form of a prohibition:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other,
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the
contrary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond the median line every point of
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial seas of the two States is measured.
This being the prohibition against extension of one State's jurisdiction
beyond the median line within the 12-mile contiguous zone of another, a
zone established by operation of the Convention to prevent infringement of
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulation of that second State, it
would seem, a fortiori, that a State may not extend, within the contiguous
zone of another, the first State's rather limited "sovereign rights" to ex-
plore and exploit the natural resources of the seabed claimed under the
Convention on the Continental Shelf or under customary international law.
If this concept is correct, the fact that either State may claim less than 12
miles for its territorial sea is quite irrelevant.
Security considerations, which are among the bases of the contiguous
zone concept, would seem to reinforce this rule, as do considerations
relating to the prevention of pollution. The latter factor is encompassed by
the Convention's recognition of the coastal State's exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to sanitary regulations in its contiguous zone.
We suggest, therefore, that in those cases in which islets are denied
recognition as basepoints for the calculation of a median or equidistance
line in the demarcation of seabed boundaries because of their small size
and distance from their owner's major territories, their "special circum-
stances" can be met by recognizing that another State cannot extend its
continental shelf rights (that is, rights to exploration and exploitation of
submarine resources) into the seabed and subsoil underlying the waters of
the islet's contiguous zone, and that only the State owning that islet can
explore and exploit the seabed resources which are within its contiguous
zone. The result of this reasoning is that an islet which is denied effect as a
basepoint for the calculation of a median line as against an opposite coast,
or the calculation of an equidistance line between adjacent States on the
same coast, for demarcation of continental shelf boundaries, is, never-
theless, to be accorded continental shelf rights in an area of the seabed and
subsoil co-extensive with its 12-mile contiguous zone.
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